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This research attempts to investigate the effect of downward sloping demand curves for stock on firms’ financing 
decisions. For the same size of equity issuance, firms with steeper slope of demand curves for their stocks experience a larger 
price drop in their share price compare to their counterparts. As a consequence, firms with a steeper slope of demand curves 
are less likely to issue equity and hence they have higher leverage ratios. This research finds that the steeper the slope of 
demand curve for firm’s stock, the higher the actual leverage of the firm. Furthermore, firms with a steeper slope of demand 
curves have higher target leverage ratios, signifying that these firms prefer debt to equity financing in order to avoid the 
adverse price impact of equity issuance on their share price. 
 





In an economic sense, the price of all assets is 
determined by supply and demand. However, in 
finance, the share price which reflects fundamental 
value of a firm is normally assumed not to be 
determined by supply and demand, but is obtained 
from discounting the firm’s expected future cash 
flows by its cost of capital. This is because classical 
finance theories assume a horizontal demand curve 
for firms’ equity and hence the share price is 
independent of supply. The term horizontal demand 
curve, perfectly elastic demand curve, infinite elastic 
demand curve is identical and they will be used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
Contrary to the assumption of horizontal demand 
curves, many researchers (among others, Shleifer 
(1986), Loderer, Cooney, and Drunen (1991), Kaul, 
Mehrotra, and Morck (2000)) have found that the 
demand curve for firms’ equity is actually downward 
sloping. Controlling for information effects, Shleifer 
(1986) tests the hypothesis of downward sloping 
demand curves by examining stocks price movement 
after they are included into S&P 500 Index. One 
would not expect index inclusions to result in a price 
effect if demand curve is horizontal. In contrast, he 
finds a share price increase at the announcement of 
the inclusion suggesting that demand curves for stock 
do slope down. This downward sloping demand 
curves for stock imply that shares need not be priced 
exactly at their fundamental values. 
A downward sloping demand curve for stocks 
suggests that new equity issues result in stock price 
decreases, therefore firms need to take into account 
this price effect when making financing decisions. 
Since the magnitude of this price effect depends on 
the slope of each individual firm’s demand curve, the 
following interesting question can be raised: “How 
does downward sloping demand curve for stocks 
affect individual firm’s financing decisions?” 
Intuitively, firms with a steeper slope of demand 
curves are more concerned about the price impact of 
equity issuance because the same amount of 
additional equity supply (issuance) causes a larger 
price drop in their share prices compared to firms with 
a flatter slope of demand curves. Consequently, 
ceteris paribus, firms with a steeper slope of demand 
curves for their stocks are less likely to issue equity 
and hence we should observe higher actual leverage 
ratios for these firms. Furthermore, to the extent that 
each firm has an optimal leverage ratio and cost of 
equity issuance is positively associated with the slope 
of demand curve, firms with a steeper slope of 
demand curves would have higher target leverage 
ratios. These predictions are the main hypotheses 
investigated in this paper. 
Hypotheses testing are performed using cross-
sectional leverage regressions and the target adjust-
ment model. Following Petajisto (2004), Haggard and 
Pereira (2005), Hirt and Pandher (2005), Baker, 
Coval, and Stein (2006), this research paper employs 
idiosyncratic risk, estimated using various methods, to 
proxy for the slope of demand curve. Leverage ratio is 
calculated in both market and book terms.  
Main findings in this research are consistent with 
preceding predictions. First, firms with a steeper slope 
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of demand curve for stock have higher actual leverage 
ratios. The slope of demand curves for stocks is 
positively and significantly related to actual leverage 
ratios, even after controlling for others factors shown 
in prior studies to influence firms’ leverage. Second, 
the slope of demand curves for stock is a positive and 
significant factor determining firms’ target leverage 
ratios suggesting that firms with steeper slope of 
demand curves are less likely to issue equity and 
prefer debt instead as a mean of financing.  
This research can potentially contribute to the 
literature in several ways. First, it sheds light on the 
relationship between the slope of the demand curve 
for stocks and firms’ capital structure. The results 
show that firm’s leverage is positively and signify-
cantly affected by the slope of demand curve for its 
stock. This finding also imply that studies in capital 
structure should consider the slope of demand curves 
for stock as one of the control variable when they 
attempt to examine the impact of particular factor on 
the firms’ leverage. Second, this research partly fills 
the gap between capital structure theories and 
observed behaviour of firms’ financing decisions. 
Main findings in this research indicate that firms do 
and should concern about the slope of demand curves 
for their shares when they make financing decisions. 
In addition to the factors mentioned in prior 
literatures, the results suggest that the slope of demand 
curves for stock provides additional explanation for 
the cross-sectional differences in firms’ leverage. 
Specifically, the downward sloping demand curves 
for stock is another important reason why firms tend 
to use debt financing instead of equity financing.  
The remainder of this research paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review. Section 3 presents the hypotheses develop-
ment. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology 
adopted in this research. Section 5 presents the data 
and estimation procedures. Section 6 reports the 
results and provides discussions of the results. The 
final section concludes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this part, it will be discussed the downward 
sloping demand curves for stocks, followed by an 
outline of major capital structure theories and the 
implication of downward sloping demand curves 
for stocks on each capital structure theory.  
 
Downward Sloping Demand Curves for Stocks 
One of the most important assumptions under-
lying several prominent finance theories is the 
investors’ ability to buy and sell any amount of a 
firm’s equity without any price impacts, which 
suggests the demand curve for a firm’s equity is 
horizontal. For example, the home leverage argument 
behind Modigliani-Miller capital structure theorem 
relies on the existence of perfect capital market, where 
the horizontal demand curve is one of the key 
conditions. Shleifer (1986) points out that “in CAPM 
and APT models, stock price is unbiased predictor of 
fundamental value, maintained through the workings 
of arbitrage”. Provided close substitutes exist for a 
stock, its fundamental value, which equals to the 
expected cash flows discounted by the cost of capital, 
is independent of the supply of equity. Therefore, the 
demand curve for a stock should be almost perfectly 
horizontal and we should observe virtually no price 
impact (Petajisto, 2004). In other words, firm can sell 
whatever quantity of stock it desires without 
concerning about the falling in its share price, because 
a horizontal demand curve suggests that the market 
can always absorb the extra supply at the fundamental 
value. 
Contrary to the theoretical assumption, there are 
number of studies suggesting that the demand curves 
for stocks are downward sloping. Scholes (1972), 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990), and 
Mikkelson and Partch (1985) examine stock price 
reactions to buyer and seller initiated large block 
trades and they document negative price reactions to 
large block sales and positive price reactions to large 
block purchases. However, in a world of information 
asymmetry, a block trade to buy (sell) may signal 
good (bad) news about the stock and thus entailing a 
price increase (decrease). Since these prior tests fail to 
distinguish whether it is the signalling effect or the 
downward sloping demand curve causes the price 
impact, they can not provide conclusive evidence on 
the hypothesis of the downward sloping demand 
curves for stocks. Fortunately, subsequent studies 
address this problem. 
To control for the impact of information effects to 
minimal, Shleifer (1986) tests the hypothesis of 
downward sloping demand curves by examining 
stocks price movement after they are included into 
S&P 500 Index. If demand curve is horizontal, one 
would not expect index inclusions to result in any 
price effect. However, if demand curves are 
downward sloping, we should observe a share price 
increase on the announcement of the inclusion. His 
conclusion is in favour of downward sloping demand 
curves for stock. Similarly, in study of positive price 
response to share repurchase announcements, 
Haggard and Pereira (2004) find that price response is 
greater for stocks with steeper demand curves. 
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Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) use change in 
supply event to detect downward sloping demand 
curves. If horizontal demand curves for stocks exist, 
without any new information, stock prices should not 
be affected by a shift in supply. They use an event 
when Toronto Stock Exchange implemented a 
previously announced redefinition of the public float. 
Public float is percentage of the firm’s equity that 
must be freely traded on the exchange in order to 
maintain a public firm status. When an exchange 
redefines public float, this action does not contain any 
information on firms’ fundamentals, it merely change 
number of freely traded shares available in the 
market. Therefore, this redefinition can be perceived 
as pure supply event. Since the revision conveyed no 
information, one would not expect to observe any 
price effect if the demand curve for stock is flat. 
Contrary to the expectation, the affected stocks 
experienced statistically significant excess return 
during the event week and no price reversal occurred 
as trading volume returned to normal levels. These 
findings support the hypothesis that demand curves 
for stocks slope down. 
Loderer, Cooney, and Drunen (1991) study the 
price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an 
individual corporation by investigating the price 
change after announcement of stock offering. Their 
finding suggests that the price decline is caused by 
finite price elasticities of demand, therefore they 
conclude that “issuing firms cannot treat the demand 
for their stock as if it were perfectly elastic”. 
Prior studies not only detect the presence of 
downward sloping demand curves but also attempt to 
provide probable reasons for their existence. The 
plausible driving forces behind downward sloping 
demand curves can be classified into the following 
four categories: limited arbitrage, liquidity induced 
compensation, shareholder heterogeneity, and diver-
gence opinion among analysts. 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) claim that the 
absence of perfect substitute makes arbitrage activities 
risky, hence risk-averse arbitrageurs are reluctant to 
engage in unlimited arbitrage, which results in 
downward sloping demand curve for stock. They 
examined the extent of stocks price jumps after 
inclusion into the S&P 500 Index and found that 
arbitrage forces are weakest, and other pricing 
anomalies are severest, among stocks without close 
substitutes. In line with the argument above, Shleifer 
and Summers (1989) argue that arbitrage is 
insufficient to counter investor sentiment and 
Mayshar (1978) points out that any firm may provide 
investors with a type of hedging they cannot duplicate 
with the shares of other firms. 
Even on organized exchanges, the market is not 
uniformly broad, deep, and resilient. Since investors 
value liquidity, traders are willing to take on large 
positions in illiquid assets only if appropriately 
compensated with a lower price (Amihud & 
Mendelson (1986), Kamara (1989), and Warga 
(1990)). If the required discount is increases with the 
size of the position, the aggregate demand schedule 
for a financial asset could be downward sloping 
(Loderer et al., 1991). 
Incomplete information cause risk averse 
investors attracted to different sets of risky assets 
(Merton, 1987). Alternatively, due to different 
information available (Parsons and Raviv, 1985) or 
different interpretations of the same information, 
investors may have different reservation prices for the 
same security. Since it takes a lower price to induce a 
larger number of investors with different reservation 
prices to buy, the aggregate demand schedules could 
be downward sloping (Loderer et al., 1991). 
 Disagreement among analysts gives a good 
indication of the riskiness of a security which in turn 
results in higher required return from investor. 
Therefore, when selling equity, firm has to offer 
discount from the fundamental value of its stock. This 
suggests that demand curve of firm’s stock is no 
longer horizontal (Miller, 1977).  
Taken together, the downward sloping demand 
curve implies that assets need not be priced exactly at 
their fundamental values (Petajisto, 2004). A new 
stock issue will cause a permanent stock price 
decrease (Barclay & Litzenberger, 1988), even the 
issuance itself does not contain any negative 
signalling effect. Therefore, the implication for issuer 
is when an equity issue is contemplated, the share 
price decrease resulting from downward sloping 
demand curve is a major cost that has to be traded off 
against the possible benefits from equity issue.  
 
Capital Structure Theories 
Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrele-
vance proposition, a large number of studies claim 
that financing decisions does matter. To date, there 
are four main theories explaining firms financing 
decisions. They are trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory, agency theory, and the market timing theory. 
In trade off theory, the balance between costs and 
benefit of debt is the major determinant of optimal 
capital structure. Benefits of debt include tax 
deductibility of interest while costs of debt include 
potential bankruptcy costs. The trade-off theory 
predicts that the firm will achieve the optimal capital 
structure by borrowing up to the point where the 
marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is just 
offset by the increase in the present value of possible 
costs of financial distress. We believe that downward 
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sloping demand curve for stocks therefore has no 
impact on firm financing decisions under this trade-
off theory as the shape of demand curves affects 
neither tax-savings nor bankruptcy costs. 
In pecking order theory proposed by Myers 
(1984), firms finance new investments with the 
following order of preference: retained earnings, safe 
debt, risky debt, and outside equity. This theory 
predicts that capital structure of the firms is the result 
of the pecking order financing and variation in a 
firm’s leverage is not driven by the costs and benefits 
of debt but by the firm’s financing deficit. Pecking 
order theory says that the firm will borrow, rather than 
issuing equity, when internal cash flow is not 
sufficient to fund capital expenditures, therefore 
“observed debt ratios will reflect the cumulative 
requirement for external financing—a requirement 
cumulated over an extended period’’ (Myers, 1984). 
Driven by information asymmetry problem, 
pecking order theory suggests that when external 
financing is necessary, firms prefer to issue debt while 
treating equity as the last resort of financing. When 
information asymmetry exists, investors associate 
equity issuance with management’s belief that the 
firm’s equity is currently overvalued. As a result, 
equity issuance is usually accompanied by share price 
decrease. To avoid the falling share price, equity is the 
least preferred method of external financing.  
The downward sloping demand curve for stocks 
amplifies the negative price impact when firms issue 
equity. Equity issuance can be seen as increase in 
supply which leads to decline in share price if the 
demand curve for stocks is downward sloping. 
Therefore, combining pecking order theory and the 
downward sloping demand curve for stocks, we 
interpret that firm’s equity issuance will be more 
unlikely. 
Under the agency theory, agency costs can arise 
from conflicts between bondholders and stockholders 
and conflicts between stockholders and managers. 
Conflicts between debt-holders and equity-holders 
introduce incentive distortion problems namely debt 
overhang (under-investments), risk shifting (asset 
substitution), managerial myopia (short sighted), and 
reluctance to liquidate (hang on to losers). These 
incentive distortion problems create agency costs of 
suboptimal investments and operating decisions. 
Thus, many growth firms tend to rely on equity to 
avoid losing the financing flexibility in the future and 
the agency costs between equity-holders and debt-
holders. 
On the contrary, agency conflicts between equity 
holders and managers can be resolved through high 
debt ratio. The need to constantly service debt 
payment forces managers to generate and pay out 
cash. As a result, the free cash flow available and 
hence manager’s opportunities for value destroying 
behaviour are greatly reduced.  
Since this theory essentially describes the cost 
and benefits of using debt from the perspective of 
agency problems, the downward sloping demand 
curve for stock has no implication for corporate 
financing decisions under this theory.  
Market timing theory suggests that firms tend to 
issue equity when market value is high, relative to 
book value and past market values, and to repurchase 
equity when market value is low. Hence, Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) point out that current capital structure 
is the “cumulative outcome of past attempts to time 
the equity market”. Graham and Harvey (2001) report 
that the extent to which companies’ shares are 
perceived to be overvalued or undervalued is one of 
managers’ most important considerations, when they 
choose the timing for equity issuance.  This result is 
clearly supporting market timing behaviour by firms.  
The downward sloping demand curves for stocks 
suggest that firms face price pressure when they issue 
equity. The extent of price pressure varies between 
firms due to the difference in the slope of their stock’s 
demand curves. Compared to their counterparts with 
flatter demand curve, firms with steeper demand 
curve face higher drop in their share price. Hence, we 
predict that they are more reluctant to issue equity 
when the condition is unfavourable (when share price 
is undervalued), while issuing more equity when 
timing becomes favourable. In short, we argue that 
firms with steeper demand curve for their stocks will 
be less likely to issue equity but more likely to engage 
in market timing behaviour as they have more 
incentive to do so.   
 
Capital Structure Decisions: A Final Trade-Off 
Each capital structure theory outlined above has 
its own strength and drawback. There is no single 
theory to date that can fully explain the mix of debt 
and equity for each firm. Each theory works better 
than others under particular circumstances. As pointed 
out by Myers (2001) “There is no universal theory of 
the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one. 
There are several useful conditional theories, 
however”. 
To conclude, the final trade-off faced by firms 
when they determine their capital structure is 
synthesized in the following table.    
This final trade-off implies that each firm has 
target leverage ratio which is the balance between the 
advantages and disadvantages of debt usage. To the 
extent that information asymmetry and stock market 
conditions affect managers’ financing decisions, the 
target leverage ratio should reflect the effect of 
downward sloping demand curves for stocks. 
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Advantages of Debt Disadvantages of Debt 
1. Tax Benefits: the 
higher the tax rates, 
the higher the tax 
benefit.  
2. Added Discipline: the 
greater shareholder-
manager agency 
problems, the greater 
the benefit of debt. 
3. Avoid Sending 




greater the benefit of 
issuing debt than 
equity because debt 




1. Direct Bankruptcy Costs: 
the higher the business risk, 
the higher the cost of 
bankruptcy. Hence lower 
the ability to take financial 
risk.  
2. Incentive Distortion: the 
greater the separation 
between stockholders and 
lenders, the higher the cost 
because the incentive 
distortion problems will be 
more severe. 
3. Loss of Future Financing 
Flexibility: the greater the 
uncertainty about future 
financing needs, the higher 
the cost. 
4. Forgo the Gain of Timing 




In terms of predicting firm’s capital structure, 
although downward sloping demand curve for stocks 
has no impact on either classical trade-off theory or 
the agency theory, it implies that equity issuance is 
less likely under pecking order theory and market 
timing theory. 
At each point in time, different firms will likely to 
have demand curve with different slope. Therefore, 
the extent of price pressure faced by equity-issuing 
firms varies. Firms with a steeper slope of demand 
curves will suffer more if they issue equity because 
the drop in their share price will be larger than firms 
with a flatter slope of demand curves. As a result, 
firms with a steeper slope of demand curves for their 
stock tend to prefer debt than equity hence we should 
observe higher debt ratio for these firms. This leads to 
the first hypothesis, other things being equal, it is 
expected that firms with a steeper slope of demand 
curves have higher leverage ratios. 
Hypothesis 1: Other things being equal, firms with a 
steeper slope of demand curves tend to have higher 
(actual) leverage ratios. 
 
The first hypothesis scrutinizes the relationship 
between the slope of demand curve for stock and debt 
ratio at a point in time. However, the final synthesized 
trade-off between the benefit and cost of debt suggests 
that firms intend to maintain a target debt ratio, hence 
when a firm’s debt level is above the target ratio, it 
should issue equity; when below the target, it should 
issue debt. This leads us to the second hypothesis as 
follows.  
Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, firms with a 
steeper slope of demand curves tend to have high 
(target) leverage ratio. 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In this section, proxies for the slope of demand 
curves will be discussed first before presenting the 
empirical models to test hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between the slope of demand curve for 
stocks and firms’ financing decisions.  
 
Proxies for the Slope of Demand Curve 
This research employs idiosyncratic risk as proxy 
for the slope of demand curve. This proxy is 
commonly used by many researchers (Baker, Coval, 
and Stein (2006), Haggard and Pereira (2005), Hirt 
and Pandher (2005), Petajisto (2004), etc).  
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) reveal that 
stocks without close substitutes have higher arbitrage 
risk and experience higher price jumps. Idiosyncratic 
risk make closer substitutes more unlikely and hence 
resulting in downward slope of demand curve. 
Likewise, Haggard and Pereira (2005) point out that 
idiosyncratic risk prevents riskless arbitrage through 
elimination of perfect substitutes for stocks, which 
results in the downward-slope demand curve. Greater 
magnitude of the proxy represents steeper demand 
curve (less elastic demand).  
Idiosyncratic risk is calculated using CAPM 
(market model) and Fama and French’s (1993) 
extended four-factor model with Carhart’s (1997) 
momentum factor as the fourth factor. Time series 
regression is performed to estimate idiosyncratic 
volatility of individual stock. 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor asset 
pricing model is considered to do a better job than 
CAPM in capturing the cross-sectional average return 
on US stocks. However, as stated in Fama and 
French’s (1996) paper, Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model cannot explain profitability of 
momentum strategies or the continuation of short 
term returns documented by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). Therefore, in addition to Fama and French’s 
(1993) three-factor model, momentum factor is 
included in this research as the fourth factor following 
Carhart’s four-factor model (1997).  
In the market model, individual stock’s daily 
excess return is regressed on market risk premium: 
titmiMKTiti rr ,,, εβα ++=  (1) 
Where: 
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tir ,  =  return of stock i in day t in excess of the risk-
free rate 
tmr ,   = ∑i titi rw ,,  with tiw , = weight of firm i at date 
t. It is value-weighted excess market return on 
all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks 
(from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury 
bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). 
 
Using the estimated alpha and beta from the 
regression, the daily excess stock return can be 
predicted by substituting the market premium into the 
equation. The difference between this predicted value 
and actual excess stock return is the daily residual risk 
for each stock. 
titmiMKTiti rr ,,, ˆˆ εβα ++=  (2) 
 
Idiosyncratic risk of the stock can be estimated in 
two ways. First, following the method used by 
Haggard and Pereira (2005), idiosyncratic volatility is 
calculated as standard deviation of daily residual risk 









sd εε  (3) 
sd =  standard deviation of the residual risk 







1 ε  = mean or average of the residual 
risk for stock i 
N =  number of trading days 
 
Under the second approach which has been used 
by many researchers (e.g. Petajisto (2004), Hirt and 
Pandher (2005)), idiosyncratic risk volatility is 
estimated using root mean square error. As a kind of 
generalized standard deviation, Root Mean Squared 
Error (RMSE) is calculated as following:  

























1ˆ1ˆ1 ε  (4) 
tir ,ˆ  =  predicted return of stock i in day t in excess of 
the risk-free rate  
ti,ε  =  residual risk for stock i at day t 
N =  number of trading days 
Generally, the smaller the RMSE, the better the 
performance of the model will be. 
Estimation of the idiosyncratic risk using Fama 
and French’s extended four-factor model is done 
similarly. First, we regress individual stock’s daily 
excess return on Fama and French’s (1993) extended 
four-factor to estimate their factors loadings:  
, ,
,
i t i iMKT m t iSMB t





= + + +
+ +  (5) 
Where: 
tir ,   =  return of stock i in day t in excess of the risk-
free rate 
tmr ,  = ∑i titi rw ,,  with tiw , = weight of firm i at date 
t. It is value-weighted excess market return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) 
minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from 
Ibbotson Associates).  
tSMB  (Small Minus Big)  = the difference between 
the returns on small and large capitalization portfolios 
(the average return on the three small portfolios minus 
the average return on the three big portfolios). 
tHML  (High Minus Low) = the difference between 
the returns on high and low book to market portfolios 
(the average return on the two value portfolios minus 
the average return on the two growth portfolios). 
tUMD  (Up Minus Down) = the difference between 
the returns on winner and loser portfolios (the average 
return on the two high prior return portfolios minus 
the average return on the two low prior return 
portfolios). 
These factors, definition of factors, and daily 
portfolio return are obtained from Kenneth French’ 
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ 
ken.french/data_library.html). 
After we get the estimation for alpha, beta, and 
the factor loadings for SMB, HML, and UMD, we 
put the actual stock’s daily excess return on the 
estimation (the line of best fit) to find the residual risk 
for each day. 
Subsequently, idiosyncratic risk of stock return is 
estimated similarly using standard deviation of daily 
residual risk (equation (3)) and root mean squared 
error of a regression of daily excess returns on the 
Fama and French’s extended four-factor (equation 
(4)).  
It should be noted that thin trading or liquidity 
problem can lead to a bias in the regression results. To 
counter this problem, idiosyncratic risk measures are 
set to missing if for a stock the number of days when 




Slope of Demand Curve and Leverage Ratio 
To test the first hypothesis that firms with steeper 
demand curve tend to have higher leverage, the 
following regression is performed: 
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εγβα +++= DCSlopeCLEV 11  (6) 
εγβα +++= DCSlopeCTDM 11  (6a) 
εγβα +++= DCSlopeCTDB 11    (6b) 
LEV, the leverage ratios have two variations; 
market leverage (TDM) and book leverage (TDB). 
We run the regression for both as there is no 
agreement among researchers over which measure-
ment is the best one. DCSlope is the slope of demand 
curve for stock. C denotes pre-determined control 
variables (will be discussed shortly), lagged one 
period. After the necessary factors correlated with 
cross-sectional differences in leverage are controlled, 
the impact of downward sloping demand curve for 
stocks on firm’s financing decisions can be observed 
by running the regression model above. 1γ , the 
coefficient of DC Slope, is predicted to be positive. 
To investigate the relationship between the slope 
of demand curve for stock and leverage, we need to 
control for other variables which affect the firm’s 
leverage. Frank and Goyal (2004) show seven core 
factors which are reliably important for predicting 
leverage decisions of publicly traded US firms from 
1950 to 2000. Their study provides useful input for 
pre-determined control variable in this research paper. 
Control variables suggested by Frank and Goyal 
(2004) are mainly used because in the process of 
obtaining those factors, they have take into account 
the parsimony consideration and control for multi-
collinearity using Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) method. This research also includes few 
additional factors used by Chang et al. (2006). 
Although there is conformity among researchers 
about which factors influence capital structure, there 
is less agreement in the interpretations of the effects. 
This paper provides commonly accepted interpre-
tations of different control variables. Alternative 
interpretations are possible. Factors which serve as 
control variables in this research are summarised 
below. 
Firm Size. Trade-off theory predicts that larger 
firms should have higher leverage because generally 
they have lower default risk. In line with that, Harris 
and Raviv (1991) documented that leverage is 
positively related to firm size. Therefore, log of the 
book value of assets as a proxy for firm size is 
included as one of control variables. 
Median Industry Leverage. Frank and Goyal 
(2004) show that industry leverage is major 
determinants of corporate leverage. Firms in high 
leverage industry, measured using median industry 
leverage, tend to have high leverage. In accordance 
with that, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) find 
that firms adjust their debt ratios towards industry 
median debt ratios. Hence, median industry leverage 
is included in the control variables. 
Tangibility. From trade-off and agency theory 
perspective, firms that have more tangible assets tend 
to have more leverage because tangible assets could 
serve as collateral. Indeed, empirical studies support 
this prediction. 
Research and development expense to sales ratio. 
Research and development expense scaled by sales 
can proxy for a variety of firm characteristics for 
instance growth potential or uniqueness of the product 
(Titman, 1984). Hence, it is included as one of the 
control variables. This paper also includes research 
and development dummy variable which equals to 
one if research and development expense is missing 
and zero otherwise. 
Firm age or maturity of the firm. Mature firms 
typically have more reputation in debt markets and 
hence face lower agency costs of debt. For this 
reason, trade-off theory predicts positive relation 
between firm’s age and leverage. To account for this, 
the age of the firm is included as a control variable. 
Market to book ratio. Market to book ratio is 
included to control for growth opportunities. 
Empirical studies document that high growth firms 
tend to have less leverage. According to agency 
theory, this is possibly because growth firms tend to 
avoid incentives distortion problems. 
Profitability. Frank and Goyal (2004) documen-
ted that firms with more profits tend to have less 
leverage. This can be explained using pecking order 
theory of capital structure which states that profitable 
firms borrow less because they have more internal 
source of funds. 
Dividends. Frank and Goyal (2004) find that 
firms which pay dividends tend to have less leverage 
than non-payers. Their finding can be explained in a 
dynamic trade-off framework but cannot be explained 
by pecking order theory because pecking order theory 
predicts the contrary. Frank and Goyal (2004) 
propose two interpretations to account for negative 
relation between leverage and dividends. First, 
dividend-paying firms have lower agency costs of 
equity and hence allow firms to issue more equity. 
Consequently, they have less leverage. Second, 
“dividend-paying firms might be those that generate 
more cash from operations relative to investment 
opportunities so they pay out the difference. Such 
firms would be unlikely to raise more debt since that 
would incur the unnecessary transactions costs 
therefore dividend paying firms would have less 
leverage.” 
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Share turnover. Share turnover is included in the 
control variables to proxy for liquidity. Illiquidity of 
firms’ stock prevents them to raise equity. They will 
prefer debt financing instead hence they will tend to 
have higher leverage.  
Stock return. Consistent with market timing 
theory and adverse selection arguments, firms are 
more likely to issue equity when their stock 
performance has been good as firms are less likely to 
be undervalued during such periods. Therefore, to 
control for past stock performance, cumulative stock 
returns is included in this research. 
Earning volatility and Altman’s unleveraged z-
score. According to trade-off theory, firms react to 
risk by reducing leverage. Hence, earning volatility 
and Altman’s unleveraged z-score are included to 
control for the risk faced by the firm (Chang et al. 
(2006)). 
Expected inflation. Firms tend to have high 
leverage when expected inflation is high. “According 
to Taggart (1985) this may reflect features in the tax 
code that favour debt when inflation is expected.” As 
noted by Frank and Goyal (2004), it might also reflect 
efforts by managers to time the market. 
 
Slope of Demand Curve and Target Adjustment 
Model 
Target adjustment model is performed to test 
whether firms with steeper demand curve have higher 
target debt ratio (the second hypothesis). In perfect 
capital market, firms always maintain their target 
leverage ratio. However, adjustment costs may 
prevent immediate adjustment to a firm’s target. The 
standard target adjustment model allows partial 
adjustment of the firm’s initial leverage ratio toward 
its target within each time period (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2004). The standard target adjustment model 
is estimated as follow:  ( ) tititititi LEVLEVLEVLEV ,1,*,11,, ελα +−+=− −−  (7) 
( ) tititititi TDMTDMTDMTDM ,1,*,11,, ελα +−+=− −−  (7a) 
( ) tititititi TDBTDBTDBTDB ,1,*,11,, ελα +−+=− −−  (7b) 
where tiLEV ,  is leverage ratio at time t for firm i and 
1, −tiLEV  is leverage ratio lagged one period. Final 
synthesized trade-off suggests that firms have a target 
debt ratio which they want to achieve hence firms that 
are above a target debt ratio should issue equity and 
firms that are below a target debt ratio should issue 
debt. Therefore, we include deviation of lagged one-
period debt ratio from the estimated target debt ratio 
in the regression.  
*
,tiLEV  denotes the target leverage ratio for firm i at 
time t, which can be expressed as a function of 
demand curve slope and a set of predetermined 
(lagged one period) control variables (C): 
1,1,2
*
, −− ++= tititi DCSlopeCLEV γβα  (8) 
1,1,2
*
, −− ++= tititi DCSlopeCTDM γβα  (8a) 
1,1,2
*
, −− ++= tititi DCSlopeCTDB γβα  (8b) 
 
By substituting equation (8) into (7), we reduce the 
target adjustment model to: 
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where λβθ =  and λγϕ = . λ  is speed of 
adjustment of the firm to the target debt ratio. Using 
the target adjustment regression model in equation 
(9), it is predicted that ϕ is positive. 
 
Regression Specifications 
This research uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression which assumes that errors have zero mean, 
constant variance (homoscedasticity), are uncorrelated 
with each other and normally distributed. To address 
the concern that the error terms are likely to violate 
OLS assumptions of homoscedasticity and cross-
sectional independence, we also estimate parameters 
and standard errors based on the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) approach. In other words, we estimate 
regression equations each year, and conduct statistical 
tests on the time-series means of the estimated 
coefficients. The results from Fama-MacBeth 
regression are similar to the ones from OLS 
regression therefore they are not reported for the 
purpose of conciseness. Study by Flannery and 
Rangan (2004) confirm this since they also find that 
OLS yields similar coefficient estimates for the same 
specifications. Therefore, we can infer that 
regressions results in this research are reliable and do 
not suffer from a serious bias. 
 
DATA AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
 
Sample 
The sample is constructed from all firms that 
exist in Compustat any time between 1971 and 2004. 
Following the common practice, non-industrial firms 
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are excluded from the sample, specifically financial 
(SIC 6000-6999) and regulated (SIC 4900-4999) 
firms. The reason of this exclusion is because the 
capital decisions of financial and regulated firms may 
reflect special factors (Flannery and Rangan, 2004). 
Firms with missing book value of assets and firms 
which have less than two consecutive years of data 
are also excluded because lagged one period data is 
needed for most of the variables in the regression. 
Exclusion of non-industrial firms and firms which 
have less than two years consecutive data result in 
complete information for 99,397 firm-year 
observations (7,785 firms). When firms with missing 
book value of assets are also excluded (to run book 
leverage regressions), it leads to 98,715 firm-year 
observations. 
Variety of Compustat and CRSP variables are 
employed. Financial statement data (debt, total assets, 
EBITDA, research and development expenses, etc.) 
are obtained from Compustat. Stock price and stock 
return are obtained from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). Adjustments are made, when 
the data is merged, to ensure that they matched each 
other correctly. For example, Compustat reports the 
number of shares in million while it is reported in 
thousand in CRSP. Hence, CRSP number of shares 
must be divided by 1,000 to arrive at the same 
measurement with Compustat. CRSP reports monthly 
data while Compustat reports annually therefore 
CRSP data need to be adjusted on yearly basis when 
they are merged.   
Outliers or extreme observations can lead to 
misleading conclusions hence they cannot be ignored. 
To deal with this problem, we use winsorization 
under which the most extreme tails of the distribution 
are replaced by the most extreme value that has not 
been removed. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of 
variables which we use and the definition of each 
variable. All of these variables are winsorized at 0.5% 
of both sides of the distribution to mitigate the impact 
of extreme observations and mis-recorded data.  
 
Variables and Variables Definition 
The dependent variable is leverage, measured 
using market leverage (TDM) and book leverage 
(TDB). Market leverage is ratio of total debt divided 
by market value of assets while book leverage is ratio 
of total debt divided by book value of assets. 
The independent variables are slope of demand 
curve for stock and control variables. All explanatory 
variables are lagged one period. Proxy for the slope of 
demand curve for stock is idiosyncratic risk of stock 
returns which is measured using RMSE-CAPM, 
RMSE-FF, RSD-CAPM, and RSD-FF. RMSE-
CAPM is root mean square error of residuals from a 
regression of daily excess returns on the market 
model. RMSE-FF is root mean square error of 
residuals from a regression of daily excess returns on 
the Fama and French’ (1993) extended four-factor. 
RSD-CAPM is standard deviation of the residuals 
from a regression of daily excess returns on the 
market model. RSD-FF is standard deviation of the 
residuals from a regression of daily excess returns on 
the Fama and French’ (1993) extended four-factor. 
Control variables are size, age, tangibility, 
Industry median leverage, profitability, turnover, 
stock return, market to book ratio, research and 
development to sales ratio, research and development 
dummy, z-score, dividend to assets ratio, and 
earning’s variability. Firm size (LNBVAD1) is log of 
book value assets deflated by Consumer Price Index 
to account for inflation. Firm age (LNAGE1) is log of 
the firm’s age or number of years since the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) year. Tangibility (TANG1) is 
the net property, plant, and equipments to asset ratio. 
Industry median leverage (MDLEV1) is the median 
of the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets 
by industry and by year. Return on Assets (ROA1), a 
profitability measurement, is the operating income 
before depreciation and amortization divided by total 
assets. Share turnover (MDTNOVER1), proxy for 
firm’s stock liquidity, is median value of monthly 
shares traded (volume) divided by shares outstanding 
over a twelve month period. Stock Return 
(STKRTN1) is compounded annual stock return over 
a twelve-month period, obtained from CRSP dataset. 
Market to Book Ratio (MBA1), well-known as proxy 
for growth opportunities, is market value of assets 
divided by book value of assets. Research and 
Development to Sales (RNDSLS1) is research and 
development expenses divided by net sales. Research 
and Development Dummy (RNDD1) is dummy 
variable which take value of one if firm does not have 
research and development expenses, zero otherwise. 
Altman Un-leveraged Z-score (ZSCORE1) is equals 
to [(3.3*pretax income + sales + 1.4*retained 
earnings + 1.2*(current assets – current liabilities))/ 
total assets]. Dividend to Assets Ratio (DIVAST1) is 
common stocks dividends divided by total assets. 
Earning’s Variability (EBITSD) is historical standard 
deviation of the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of 
employyed variables in overall sample. All of these 
variables are winsorized at 0.5% of both side of the 
distribution to avoid the influence of extreme 
observations and mis-recorded data. The mean, 
median, and standard deviation of each variable are 
reported in the table. On average, market leverage 
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ratio in overall sample is 20% while book leverage 
ratio is 24%. The median of market leverage ratio and 
book leverage ratio are 16% and 22% respectively. 
Idiosyncratic volatility (proxy for the slope of demand 
curve for stock) as measured using RMSE-CAPM, 
RMSE-FF, RSD-CAPM, and RSD-FF has mean, 
median, and standard deviation of 4%, 3%, and 3% 
respectively. When four decimal points are used 
instead of two decimal points, we can see the slight 
difference of idiosyncratic volatility estimation using 
those various methods i.e. RMSE-CAPM, RMSE-FF, 
RSD-CAPM, and RSD-FF. However, the difference 
is trivial. Average age of firms listed in Compustat 
between 1971 and 2004 is 17.33 years. The minimum 
number of years per firm is 2, the maximum is 34, 
and the median is 14. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Market Leverage 
(TDM) 0.20 0.16 0.18 
Book Leverage (TDB)  0.24 0.22 0.19 
Firm Size (BVAD) 1725.31 163.00 7575.54 
Age (years) 17.33 14.00 11.19 
Tangibility (TANG) 0.32 0.27 0.22 
Industry Median 
Leverage (MDLEV)  0.17 0.16 0.11 
Return On Assets 
(ROA) 0.08 0.12 0.41 
Share Turnover 
(MDTNOVER) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Stock Return 
(STKRTN) 0.16 0.05 0.68 
Market to Book Ratio 
(MBA) 1.78 1.27 1.86 
R&D to Sales Ratio 
(RNDSLS) 0.11 0.00 0.63 
R&D Dummy (RNDD) 0.35 0.00 0.48 
Un-leveraged Z-score 
(ZSCORE) 1.57 2.09 3.54 
Dividend to Assets 
(DIVAST) 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Earning Variability 
(EBITSD) 94.70 11.59 297.11 
RMSE-CAPM 0.04 0.03 0.03 
RMSE-FF 0.04 0.03 0.03 
RSD-CAPM 0.04 0.03 0.03 
RSD-FF 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients among 
several key variables of interest. From pairwise 
correlation coefficients among various proxies for the 
slope of demand curves for stock, it can be inferred 
that various measurement (RMSE-CAPM, RMSE-
FF, RSD-CAPM, and RSD-FF) to estimate 
idiosyncratic volatility do not differ much and their 
correlation coefficients are close to one. This suggests 
that those various measurements are consistent with 
each other in estimating idiosyncratic risk of 
individual stock.  
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Table 2 also displays the correlation coefficients 
between slope of demand curves and leverage. This 
univariate analysis shows that the slope of demand 
curve for stock (as shown by RMSE-CAPM, RMSE-
FF, RSD-CAPM, and RSD-FF) is positively related 
to the leverage ratio. Greater magnitude of RMSE-
CAPM, RMSE-FF, RSD-CAPM, and RSD-FF 
represent steeper demand curve for a firm’s stock. 
This preliminary evidence supports the idea that firms 
with steeper demand curve tend to have higher 
leverage ratio.  
Pairwise correlation coefficients between control 
variables and leverage are reported in table 2 as well. 
Most correlation coefficients have expected signs. For 
instance, size and leverage are positively correlated. 
Tangibility and leverage are positively correlated 
suggesting that firms which have more tangible assets 
tend to have more leverage. The low correlations 
among independent variables indicate that one can 
include these variables in the same regressions 
without concerning about multicollinearity. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Slope of Demand Curve for Stock and Actual 
Leverage Ratio 
 
Actual Market Leverage 
Table 3 presents the regression results of actual 
market leverage on the slope of demand curve for 
stock. Results show that there is positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the slope 
of demand curve for stock and actual market leverage 
and are consistent across various measurement 
methods of the slope of demand curve for stock 
(RMSE-CAPM, RMSE-FF, RSD-CAPM, and RSD-
FF). Even after controlling for other factors shown in 
prior studies to influence leverage, the coefficient of 
the slope of demand curve for firm’s stock on firm’s 
actual market leverage is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level demonstrating that firms with 
steeper slope of demand curves tend to have higher 
actual market leverage. This result also implies that 
the slope of demand curves for stock is an additional 
determinant factor in predicting firm’s market 
leverage.  
Most control variables are significant and have 
the expected signs. For instance, firm size, tangibility, 
and industry median leverage are positively related to 
leverage. This is consistent with prior literatures (e.g. 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Frank and Goyal (2004)). 
Harris and Raviv (1991) document that larger firms 
have higher leverage. It is well known that firms with 
more tangible assets tend to have higher leverage as 
they can pledge their assets in support of debt. Frank 
and Goyal (2004) find that industry leverage is 
prominent determinant of firm’s leverage, which is 
exactly what is found in this research. They provide 
explanation that firms in high leverage industry have 
higher leverage since firms in the same industry must 
face many common factors. 
 
Table 3.  Actual Market Leverage and the Slope of 
Demand Curve  
(1) (2) (3) (4) LEVERAGE 
(TDM) RMSE-
CAPM RMSE-FF RSD-CAPM RSD-FF 
DCSlope 1.227*** 1.227*** 1.230*** 1.240*** 
 (16.9) (16.8) (16.9) (16.8) 
LNBVAD1 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (23.2) (23.2) (23.2) (23.2) 
LNAGE1 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.9) (-2.9) (-2.9) (-2.9) 
TANG1 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (11.9) (11.9) (11.9) (11.9) 
MDLEV1 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 
 (45.2) (45.2) (45.2) (45.2) 
ROA1 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) 
MDTNOVER1 -18.285*** -18.058*** -18.287*** -18.064*** 
 (-17.2) (-17.1) (-17.2) (-17.1) 
STKRTN1 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-15.8) (-15.7) (-15.8) (-15.7) 
MBA1 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (-22.6) (-22.5) (-22.6) (-22.5) 
RNDSLS1 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (-10.7) (-10.7) (-10.7) (-10.7) 
RNDD1 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (6.3) (6.2) (6.3) (6.2) 
ZSCORE1 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-7.5) (-7.5) (-7.5) (-7.5) 
DIVAST1 -1.569*** -1.572*** -1.569*** -1.571*** 
 (-21.8) (-21.8) (-21.8) (-21.8) 
EBITSD -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-12.6) (-12.6) (-12.6) (-12.6) 
Constant 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.3) 
Observations 99397 99397 99397 99397 
R-Squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
 
Others significant factors, namely maturity of 
firms, stock’s liquidity, stock return, market to book 
ratio, R&D to sales ratio, Altman un-leveraged z-
score, dividend to assets, and earning variability are 
negatively related to firm’s actual leverage ratio. 
Consistent with prior studies and agency theory, 
market to book ratio (as proxy for growth 
opportunities) is found negatively related to firm’s 
leverage possibly because growth firms want to avoid 
debt overhang problems. In line with that, R&D to 
sales ratio is negatively related to firm’s leverage 
ratio. This research also found that stock return, to 
control for past stock performance, is negatively 
related to leverage. This result is consistent with the 
market timing theory which states that firms are more 
likely to issue equity hence having lower debt 
proportion when their stock performance has been 
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good. In accordance with Frank and Goyal (2004), 
this paper finds that dividend paying firms tend to 
have lower leverage ratio.  
Contrary to the view that mature firms typically 
have higher leverage because they have more 
reputation in debt markets hence can borrow at lower 
cost of debt, this research find that mature firms tend 
to borrow less. This probably because mature firms 
have more cash flow in the first place thus not only 
need less outside financing, but also tend to pay-off 
debt instead of borrows more. Firms with more liquid 
stocks tend to have less leverage. The liquidity of 
firm’s stocks suggests that firms can raise equity more 
easily and cheaply in the market because markets can 
absorb firm’s stocks in the event of equity issuance. 
The more liquid firms’ stocks, the more likely firms 
will issue equity hence the lower their leverage will 
be. Finally, as suggested by trade-off theory, firms 
react to risk by reducing leverage. In line with this 
view, this research paper finds that earnings 
variability (proxy for risk) is negatively related with 
leverage. 
 
Actual Book Leverage 
The regression of actual book leverage on various 
proxies of the slope of demand curve for stock is 
reported in table 4. When book leverage is used 
instead of market leverage, the same results are found. 
The slope of demand curves for stock is a positive and 
statistically significant factor in predicting book 
leverage of the firm, even though other variables 
shown to affect leverage had been controlled. Across 
various proxies of the slope of demand curve for stock 
(RMSE-CAPM, RMSE-FF, RSD-CAPM, and RSD-
FF), the coefficient of the slope of demand curve for 
stock to the actual book leverage is positive and 
significant at 1% level suggesting that firms with 
steeper slope of demand curves have higher actual 
book leverage.  
Other factors i.e. the control variables have same 
signs and magnitude as in market leverage regression. 
The only remarkable difference is that return on assets 
(ROA) as one of the profitability measures is a 
positive and statistically significant factor to explain 
book leverage while it is insignificant for market 
leverage. This is possibly because ROA as an 
accounting ratio, is based on book value and more 
backward looking which are features also shared by 
book leverage.  
To sum up, the results from leverage regression 
show that slope of demand curve for stock has 
positive and significant effect on the firm’s actual 
leverage ratio (measured using either  market or book 
leverage), even after controlling for other factors 
which have been shown in past literatures to influence 
firm’s leverage. The results confirm the first 
hypothesis that firms with steeper demand curve for 
their stock suffer more from the share price drop if 
they issue equity hence are less likely to issue equity. 
Consequently, we will observe higher actual leverage 
ratio for these firms, which is exactly what is found 
from the empirical studies in this research. 
 
Table 4.  Actual Book Leverage and the Slope of 
Demand Curve  
(1) (2) (3) (4) LEVERAGE 
(TDB) RMSE-
CAPM RMSE-FF RSD-CAPM RSD-FF 
DCSlope 0.990*** 0.994*** 0.992*** 1.004*** 
 (14.3) (14.2) (14.3) (14.2) 
LNBVAD1 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (21.8) (21.9) (21.8) (21.9) 
LNAGE1 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-4.8) (-4.8) (-4.8) (-4.8) 
TANG1 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (13.1) (13.1) (13.1) (13.1) 
MDLEV1 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.411*** 
 (33.9) (33.9) (33.9) (33.9) 
ROA1 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 (5.2) (5.2) (5.2) (5.2) 
MDTNOVER1 -14.763*** -14.592*** -14.764*** -14.596*** 
 (-11.3) (-11.2) (-11.3) (-11.2) 
STKRTN1 -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (-4.0) (-3.9) (-4.0) (-3.9) 
MBA1 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-10.7) (-10.6) (-10.7) (-10.6) 
RNDSLS1 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (-8.9) (-8.9) (-8.9) (-8.9) 
RNDD1 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (8.5) (8.5) (8.5) (8.5) 
ZSCORE1 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-12.2) (-12.2) (-12.2) (-12.2) 
DIVAST1 -1.554*** -1.555*** -1.554*** -1.555*** 
 (-19.7) (-19.7) (-19.7) (-19.7) 
EBITSD -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-8.2) (-8.2) (-8.2) (-8.2) 
Constant 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (7.9) (7.9) (7.9) (7.8) 
Observations 98715 98715 98715 98715 
R-Squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
 
Slope of Demand Curve for Stock and Target 
Leverage Ratio 
 
Target Market Leverage 
Table 5 reports target adjustment regression 
results when market leverage is used. The results 
show that the slope of demand curves for stocks is a 
positive and statistically significant factor to explain 
the target market leverage ratio, even after controlling 
for lagged one period market leverage ratio and other 
factors. The findings that lagged one period market 
leverage ratio (TDM1) has significant positive effect 
on the target market leverage ratio indicating that 
firms gradually adjust to the target leverage ratio. 
From the positive and significant coefficient of lagged 
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one period market leverage ratio, )1( λ− , we can 
infer how fast firms adjust their market leverage ratio 
to the estimated target market leverage ratio. The 
coefficient of the lagged market leverage is 0.841. It 
implies that firms close 15.9% (= 1 - 0.841) of the gap 
between current and target leverage within one year.  
 
Table 5.  Target Market Leverage and the Slope 
of  Demand Curve 




CAPM RMSE-FF RSD-CAPM RSD-FF 
TDM1 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 
 (299.7) (299.8) (299.7) (299.8) 
DCSlope 0.210*** 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 
 (8.7) (8.6) (8.7) (8.6) 
LNBVAD1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (14.5) (14.5) (14.5) (14.5) 
LNAGE1 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-16.1) (-16.1) (-16.1) (-16.1) 
TANG1 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (10.4) (10.4) (10.4) (10.4) 
MDLEV1 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (13.0) (13.0) (13.0) (13.0) 
ROA1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-0.7) (-0.7) (-0.7) (-0.7) 
MDTNOVER1 -0.385 -0.339 -0.386 -0.343 
 (-1.0) (-0.9) (-1.0) (-0.9) 
STKRTN1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (4.4) (4.3) (4.4) (4.3) 
MBA1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) 
RNDSLS1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-5.8) (-5.8) (-5.8) (-5.8) 
RNDD1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (7.7) (7.7) (7.7) (7.7) 
ZSCORE1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (2.8) (2.7) (2.8) (2.7) 
DIVAST1 -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.110*** 
 (-6.7) (-6.8) (-6.7) (-6.8) 
EBITSD -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-13.9) (-13.9) (-13.9) (-13.9) 
Constant 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (6.8) (6.8) (6.8) (6.8) 
Observations 99397 99397 99397 99397 
R-Squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
 
The coefficient of DCSlope to target market 
leverage ratio, ϕ , is also positive and significant. This 
result is consistent with Hypothesis 2 which states that 
firms with steeper demand curve tend to have higher 
target leverage ratios. We can also infer the coefficient 
of the slope of demand curve to the target market 
leverage ratio from the result. For instance, using 
RMSE of Fama and French’s extended four-factor 
model as proxy for the slope of demand curve, the 
coefficient of the slope of demand curve to market 
leverage ratio, ϕ , is 0.209. Since λγϕ = , we can 
decompose them to find the impact of the slope of 
demand curve to the target market leverage ratio. We 
know that ϕ  is 0.209 and λ  is 0.159, hence we can 
figure out that γ , the coefficient of demand curve 
slope to the target market leverage ratio, is 1.314. In 
this case, we also found that the impact of the slope of 
demand curve to the target debt ratio is positive and 
significant which means that firms with steeper 
demand curve tend to have higher target market 
leverage ratio. 
Other factors have expected sign and similar to 
the results found in the actual leverage regression. 
Note however, when lagged one period debt ratio of 
the firm is included in the regression, some significant 
explanatory variables in previous regressions 
(equation 6(a)), specifically stock’s liquidity and 
market to book ratio, are no longer significant.  
 
Target Book Leverage 
Table 6 presents target adjustment regression 
result using book leverage as the dependent variable. 
Essentially, using book leverage instead of market 
leverage in the model does not alter the main finding.  
Lagged one period book leverage ratio (TDB1) 
has significant positive effect on the target book 
leverage ratio indicating that firms gradually adjust to 
the target leverage ratio. Similar to the result in target 
adjustment regression using market leverage, the 
coefficient on the lagged book leverage implies that 
firms close 15.9% (= 1 - 0.841) of the gap between 
current and target leverage within one year. 
The slope of demand curve for stock also has 
significant positive effect on the target book leverage 
ratio, even though other factors shown to affect 
leverage and lagged one period book leverage ratio 
had been controlled. Using RMSE of Fama and 
French’s extended four-factor model as proxy for the 
slope of demand curve, the coefficient of the slope of 
demand curve to book leverage ratio, ϕ , is 0.187. 
Since λγϕ = , we can decompose them to find the 
impact of the slope of demand curve to the target 
book leverage ratio. We know that ϕ  is 0.187 and λ  
is 0.159, hence we can figure out that γ , the 
coefficient of demand curve slope to the target book 
leverage ratio is 1.176. The results support the second 
hypothesis which predicts that firms with steeper 
slope of demand curve tend to have higher target 
leverage ratio. The reason is because firms with a 
steeper slope of demand curve for their stock are less 
likely to issue equity since they will suffer more in the 
declining of their share price when they choose to do 
so. 
Other factors have expected sign and similar to 
the result of actual book leverage regression. Note 
however, when lagged one period debt ratio of the 
firm is included in the regression, some significant 
explanatory variables in previous regressions 
(equation 6(b)), specifically return on assets, stock’s 
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liquidity, and market to book ratio, and Altman un-
leveraged z-score are no longer significant. 
Compared to market leverage target adjustment 
regression, one prominent difference is that the effect 
of Altman un-leveraged z-score on the book leverage 
is not significant while it is significant on the market 
leverage. 
 
Table 6. Target Book Leverage and the Slope of 
Demand Curve 




CAPM RMSE-FF RSD-CAPM RSD-FF 
TDB1 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 0.841*** 
 (275.6) (275.6) (275.6) (275.6) 
DCSlope 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.189*** 
 (7.4) (7.4) (7.4) (7.4) 
LNBVAD1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (9.7) (9.8) (9.7) (9.8) 
LNAGE1 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-9.5) (-9.5) (-9.5) (-9.5) 
TANG1 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5) 
MDLEV1 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (10.9) (10.9) (10.9) (10.9) 
ROA1 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-1.6) (-1.6) (-1.6) (-1.6) 
MDTNOVER1 0.176 0.208 0.176 0.205 
 (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) 
STKRTN1 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-7.9) (-7.9) (-7.9) (-7.9) 
MBA1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.3) (-1.2) (-1.3) (-1.2) 
RNDSLS1 -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* 
 (-2.0) (-2.0) (-2.0) (-2.0) 
RNDD1 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (8.0) (8.0) (8.0) (8.0) 
ZSCORE1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.0) (-0.0) (-0.0) (-0.0) 
DIVAST1 -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.087*** 
 (-4.4) (-4.4) (-4.4) (-4.4) 
EBITSD -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-7.0) (-7.0) (-7.0) (-7.0) 
Constant 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (8.7) (8.7) (8.7) (8.7) 
Observations 98534 98534 98534 98534 
R-Squared 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
 
To summarize, results from the target adjustment 
regression model demonstrate that downward sloping 
demand curve for stock has significant positive effect 
on the target leverage ratio which suggests that the 
steeper the slope of demand curve for firm’s stock, the 
higher the firm’s target leverage ratio. This result 
verifies Hypothesis 2 and holds regardless whether 
market leverage or book leverage is used. Lagged 
debt ratio in the target adjustment regression model is 
also positive and significant which indicates that firms 
gradually adjust to the target leverage ratio. It is found 
that the estimated adjustment speed to close the gap 
between firm’s actual leverage ratio and target 




This research paper empirically investigates the 
effect of downward sloping demand curves for stock 
on firms’ financing decisions. Downward sloping 
demand curves for stock implies that when firms 
issue equity (which can be seen as an increase in 
supply), the share price of issuing firms will decrease. 
The decline in the firm’s share price depends on the 
slope of demand curve. For the same amount of 
equity issuance, firms with a steeper slope of demand 
curve experience a larger price drop than firms with 
flatter demand curves. Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is 
argued that firms with steeper demand curves are less 
likely to issue equity and hence we should observe 
higher actual leverage ratios for these firms. To the 
extent that each firm has an optimal leverage ratio, 
these firms should also have higher target leverage 
ratios.   
The main findings in this research paper provide 
supporting evidence on the proposed hypotheses. 
Results show that firms with steeper demand curves 
for stock have higher actual leverage ratios. Even after 
controlling for other factors which had been shown in 
prior studies to influence firms’ leverage, it is found 
that the slope of demand curves for stock positively 
and significantly affects a firm’s actual leverage. The 
results indicate that firms with steeper demand curves 
are more likely to choose debt than equity in order to 
avoid greater adverse price impact of equity issuance 
on their share price. Furthermore, firms’ target 
leverage ratios are higher for firms with steeper 
demand curves. Unlike actual leverage, firms’ target 
leverage is not directly observable. However, we can 
attain it using a target adjustment model. From the 
target adjustment regression, it can be seen that the 
slope of demand curve for stock is a positive, 
statistically significant factor for firms’ target leverage 
ratios suggesting that there are additional incentives 
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VARIABLES DEFINITION AND VARIABLES 
CONSTRUCTION 
 
Market Value of Equity is defined as the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by closing stock price at 
the end of the fiscal year (from CRSP). 
 
Market Leverage (TDM) is ratio of total debt divided 
by market value of assets i.e. market value of equity 
plus total liability {(Compustat item 9 + Compustat 
item 34)/(market value of equity + (Compustat item 9 
+ Compustat item 34))}. 
 
Book Leverage (TDB) is ratio of total debt divided by 
book value of assets {(Compustat item 9 + Compustat 
item 34)/Compustat item 6}. 
 
Size (LNBVAD) is log of book value of assets 
deflated by Consumer Price Index to account for 
inflation {Compustat item number 6/Consumer Price 
Index}. 
 
Age is the firm’s age measured as the number of 
years since the Initial Public Offering (IPO) year.  
 
Tangibility (TANG) is the net property, plant, and 
equipments to asset ratio {Compustat item 
8/Compustat item 6}.  
 
Industry Median Leverage (MDLEV) is the median 
of the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets 
by three-digit SIC code and by year. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) is the operating income 
before depreciation and amortization divided by total 
assets {Compustat item 13/Compustat item 6}.  
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Median turnover (MDTNOVER), proxy for firm’s 
stock liquidity, is median value of monthly shares 
traded (volume) divided by shares outstanding over a 
twelve month period.  
 
Annual Stock Return (STKRTN) is compounded 
annual stock return over a twelve-month period. 
Stock return is obtained from CRSP dataset. 
 
Market-to-book ratio (MBA) is defined as market 
value of assets divided by total assets {(market value 
of equity + (Compustat item 9 + Compustat item 
34))/Compustat item 6}.   
 
R&D to Sales (RNDSLS) is research and develop-
ment expenses to sales ratio {Compustat item 
46/Compustat item 12}. 
 
R&D Dummy (RNDD) is dummy variable which 
take value of one if research and development 
expense is missing, zero otherwise. 
 
Altman’s Un-leveraged Z-score (ZSCORE) is 
obtained from (3.3*pretax income + sales + 
1.4*retained earnings + 1.2*(current assets – current 
liabilities)) divided by total assets.  {(3.3*Compustat 
item 178 + Compustat item 12 + 1.4*Compustat item 
36 + 1.2*(Compustat item 4 – Compustat item 
5))/Compustat item 6}. 
 
DIVAST is common stocks dividends to assets ratio 
{Compustat item 21/Compustat item 6}. 
 
EBITSD is historical standard deviation (using 
available data during the previous 10 years) of the 
ratio of EBITDA to total assets. It is a measurement 
of earning’s variability {standard deviation 
(Compustat item 13/Compustat item 6)}. 
 
